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Abstract
We apply  propensity  score  matching  to  the  estimation  of  the  disparity  in  school 
effectiveness  between the privately owned, privately funded school  sector  and the 
public one in a sample of 25 countries in Europe, America and Asia. This technique 
allows us to distinguish between school choice and school effectiveness processes and 
thus, to account for selectivity induced variation in school effectiveness. We find two 
broad patterns  of  private  independent  school  choice:  the  choice  as  a social  class  
reproduction choice; and the choice of an outsider’s for a good-equipped school. As 
regards school effectiveness, our results show that, after controlling for selectivity and 
school  choice  processes,  the  initial  higher  reading  scores  of  students  in  private-
independent  schools  become  comparable  to  those  public  schools  students  in  a 
majority  of countries.  However,  in a  few countries average reading scores remain 
higher in the private independent  sector even after  introducing controls  for school 
choice induced selectivity.  The opposite pattern,  namely of higher average reading 
scores in the public sector has also been found in four countries. 
Keywords:  school  choice;  school  effectiveness;  private-independent  and  public 
schools; international comparison.
1. Introduction
The differences in scholastic achievement between public and private schools have 
been the topic of a large number of studies in the educational sciences, sociology and 
economics,  mostly  in  the  USA  but  also  to  some  extent  in  Europe.  Within  this 
literature, a significant distinction emerges inside the private sector, namely the one 
between private-dependent (i.e. publicly financed) and private independent schools. 
The  distinction  is  important  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  in  many  countries, 
especially in continental Europe, these two types of schools coexist alongside each 
other and alongside public schools, often as an unintended outcome of the 19th century 
struggle around school ownership and financing between the State and Church(es). 
Second,  the  functions  that  these  types  of  schools  fulfil  can  differ  significantly, 
depending  on  the  social,  religious  or  ethnic  groups  that  charter  them.  Third,  the 
distinction  between public  schools  and private  government-dependent  schools  also 
relates to current policy debates about the organization, provision and financing of 
collective goods like education. 
Starting with the ‘80s, on the backdrop of resurging neoliberal ideas, Anglo-
Saxon countries have witnesses renewed debates  around school choice and school 
effectiveness. Parental choice and state-funded private schools are often advocated in 
the United States as a means of introducing competition for pupils among schools and 
decreasing the level of bureaucracy, thereby improving the quality of teaching and 
reducing the cost of education (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Another argument used in the 
American context states that schools should offer young people an education that is in 
accordance with the way of life of their parents. This latter line of reasoning comes 
closer to the European tradition of government dependent religious schools (Godwin 
& Kemerer, 2002). The developments taking place in the United States influenced the 
discourse on the relation between public and private schools in Europe, especially in 
the UK, where subsidized private schools were rare. 
Due to its implications for educational policy,  any differential  effectiveness 
between  private  and  public  schools  constitutes  an  important  research  topic.  The 
debate started with the study of Coleman, Hoffer & Kilgore (1982), who claimed that 
pupils  attending  Catholic  schools  in  the  USA  achieved  at  higher  levels  than 
comparable students in the public sector. This study was the start of a huge and still 
ongoing debate and research in the USA on public and private schools, potential state 
subsidies for religious schools and parental school choice. Coleman and Hoffer (1987) 
and Bryk, Lee and Holland (1993) provided comprehensive follow-up studies. 
2. Public-private comparisons
Comparisons between the achievement of students in private and the public schools 
have been carried out mainly on a national basis. In the US, research based on the 
High School  and Beyond and  on the  National  Education  Longitudinal  Study,  has 
generated heated controversies about whether private, in particular Catholic, schools 
were able to raise the achievement of the pupils more than schools in the public sector 
(Greeley 1982; Noell 1982; Alexander and Pallas 1983; Willms 1985; Coleman and 
Hoffer 1987; Chubb and Moe 1990; Gamoran 1996; Neal 1997; Hoffer 1998; Jeynes 
2002).  However,  despite  the  impressive  amount  of  research  carried  out,  findings 
remain inconsistent  and inconclusive.  Results  have depended on the timing of the 
study,  on the  particular  research design  and included variables,  as  well  as  on the 
precise statistical methods used. 
Although the differences in scholastic achievement between public and private 
(dependent or independent)  schools are relevant for nearly all developed countries, 
little cross-national research has looked into these differences in a comparative way. 
Making  use  of  the  PISA  2000  survey,  Dronkers  &  Robert  (2008a;  2008b)  have 
conducted a systematic comparison of the effectiveness of public, private-dependent 
and private-independent schools in 22 OECD countries. Their analysis has found that, 
albeit the larger part of the gross scholastic achievement differences between public 
and  private-dependent  schools  could  be  explained  by  differences  in  their  student 
intake  and  by  the  related  differences  in  school  composition,  private  government-
dependent  schools  still  maintained  an  advantage  in  the  average  reading  score 
compared to public schools. This advantage could not be explained either in terms of 
student  and parent  characteristics,  or compositional  effects.  Moreover,  the private-
dependent sector advantage was found to be universal, meaning that it was more or 
less equal in the various countries. 
Dronkers & Robert  (2008a; 2008b) also showed that the effects of private-
dependent  schools  on  educational  performance  deviate  from  those  of  private 
independent  schools.  This  finding  suggests  that  it  is  an  error  to  lump  private-
dependent  and  private  independent  schools  together  as  schools  operating  under 
comparable  market-circumstances:  the  two  school  types  can  have  potentially 
contradictory  effects  that  will  neutralize  each  other  when  all  private  schools  are 
treated the same way(this mistake is made by for instance by Vandenberghe & Robin 
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(2004) in their analysis of the PISA 2000 data and by Somers, McEwan & Willms 
(2004) in their analysis of Latin-American private schools). 
Another  analysis  of  the  same PISA 2000 data  (Corten  & Dronkers,  2006) 
suggests  that  private  government-dependent  schools  are  more  effective  for  pupils 
from families with low levels of cultural possessions. They found no indication that 
private government-dependent schools were more favourable for children from higher 
social strata.
In this  article  we focus  on the  school  choice  and effectiveness  differences 
between private  government-independent  schools  and public  schools.  In  an earlier 
article (Dronkers & Avram, 2010) we have made the same cross-national analysis for 
private-dependent and public schools. A comparison between both articles reveals that 
the  substantive  outcomes  for  government-dependent  and  government-independent 
schools are quite different, again underlining that these are distinct types of private 
schools.  Concerning  school  choice  between  private-dependent  schools  and  public 
schools,  we found two patterns:  a  choice of upwardly mobile  parents  for private-
dependent schools and a preference for segregation by (lower-) middle class parents. 
As regards school effectiveness of private dependent-schools compared with public 
school,  our  results  indicated  that,  after  controlling  for  selectivity,  a  substantial 
advantage in reading achievement remains among students in publicly funded private 
schools in ten out of the 26 countries.
3. Unmeasured selectivity of school choice and school effectiveness
The literature on the possible causes of differences in scholastic achievement among 
schools is extensive. Although we cannot discuss at length this literature, we point out 
some useful reviews (Sammons, Hillman, & Mortimore, 1995; Scheerens & Bosker, 
1997;  Teddlie  & Reynolds,  2000).  The main problem encountered when trying  to 
assess  the  school  effects  on  achievement  resides  in  the  unknown  and  therefore, 
unmeasured selectivity involved in opting for a private school instead of a public one. 
Indeed, a number of studies have pointed out that private and public school students 
differ in substantial ways such as parental education, income and wealth, educational 
resources present at home, parental involvement in the pupil’s educational career, and 
so on (Coleman, Hoffer et al. 1982; Greeley 1982; Coleman and Hoffer 1987; Witte 
2000; Yang and Kayaardi 2004; Goldring and Phillips 2008). More generally, when 
attendance of a school, whether public or private, is ‘free’ meaning both parental and 
school  selection  occur  before  a  student  can  enrol,  selectivity  is  always  an  issue. 
Wealthier,  better  informed,  and  better  educated  parents  will  presumably  have  an 
advantage in finding and in gaining access to the ‘best’ school for their child (Ball 
1993; Ball,  Bowe et al.  1995; Echols and Willms 1995; Ball  1997; Goyette 2008; 
Jarvis and Alvanides 2008).
Analyses  in  the  school  effectiveness  tradition  (Dronkers  & Robert  (2008a; 
2008b) follow that tradition) assume that the measured parental and pupil variables 
will control for any selectivity induced by school choice processes. This assumption 
seems appropriate  when comparing  the effectiveness  of public  schools within and 
across countries, as most often public schools have fixed catchment-areas and involve 
virtually no parental school choice, aside from the indirect choice of residence. 
But this assumption is questionable if it is applied to the choice between public 
and private schools, even in societies in which the choice between public and private 
government-dependent  schools  is  hardly  influenced  by  school  fees  (as  in  the 
Netherlands). A host of factors associated with parental and student background might 
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be linked to both choice processes and outcomes, and this almost surely brings about 
unmeasured  heterogeneity,  which  might  or  might  not  be  solved  by the  measured 
parental and pupil variables. More generally, the fact that both parents and schools are 
relatively  unconstrained  in  picking  a  school  or  a  student  amplifies  self-selection 
problems.
To address the issue of selectivity, we propose using another approach, namely 
propensity  score  matching  to  explicitly  disentangle  school  choice  processes  from 
school-effectiveness. In a first step, we estimate the likelihood of choosing a private-
independent  school  rather  than  a  public  one.  The  result  assigns  to  each  pupil  a 
propensity  score  of  choosing  a  private  rather  than  a  public  school,  based  on  the 
characteristics of the pupil,  her parents and the features of the chosen school. The 
second step of the approach consists  of estimating the effectiveness  of non-public 
schools, based on a matched sample of pupils with similar propensities of choosing a 
private school but who nonetheless attended a public one.
In this article, we focus on the choice between public and private-independent 
schools (private schools which get their financial resources mainly from tuition and/or 
other private funds) and on the corresponding differences in school effectiveness in 
the cognitive domain (reading)2.  In another  article  (Dronkers & Avram, 2010) we 
have made the same cross-national analysis for private-dependent and public school in 
25 countries. 
4.  Another  approach  to  disentangle  the  relations  between  choice  and 
effectiveness 
To distinguish between school choice and school effectiveness processes, we employ 
a technique called propensity score matching.3 It has been used for several decades in 
other fields, particularly in economics (see Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, for one of the 
original pieces in this method and Dehejia & Sadek, 2002, for a more recent review). 
The  technique  approximates  a  quasi-experimental  design  with  secondary  data  by 
comparing individuals in a “treatment group” (in this case, pupils in private schools) 
to those in a “control group” (pupils in public schools) who have a similar likelihood 
of  experiencing  the  treatment  according  to  observable  characteristics.  This 
comparison is accomplished by using a logistic regression to estimate the propensity 
that the pupil will choose a private school. The propensity score is defined as follows 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983):
P(T) ≡ Pr {T = 1‌‌‌‌/S} = E{T/S}
where P(T) is the propensity of choosing a private school, T indicates that the pupil 
did or did not choose a private school (the treatment) and S is a vector of covariates 
influencing the private school choice. 
The resulting propensity score is used to match4 pupils who did with those that 
did  not  choose private  schools,  our  treatment  and control  groups.  Students  in  the 
treatment  group  that  could  not  be  matched  based  on  their  propensity  score  are 
discarded  from subsequent  analyses.  The  mean  estimated  difference  in  academic 
achievement between the matched treatment and control groups represents the effect 
of  attending  a  private  school  on  achievement  for  students  with  propensity  scores 
within  the  range of  the  matched  sample,  i.e.  the  average  treatment  effect  for  the 
treated. 
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We want to stress that propensity score matching techniques are not a “magic 
bullet”. They only account well for selection if two assumptions are met. First, all 
observable variables influencing both the treatment – school choice - and the outcome 
– academic achievement- must be included in the propensity score model, i.e. there 
has to be conditional independence. Second, selection processes have to be captured 
well by variables predicting the propensity to experience the treatment of interest. But 
these issues arise no matter what method one uses, even the simplest.  Thus, when 
comparing  different  modeling  strategies,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  every 
method has its own limitations. OLS regression analysis (which is most commonly 
used  in  school  effectiveness  analysis,  multi-level  models  included)  estimates  the 
average  treatment  effect  of  private  school  attendance  for  the  full  sample  when 
controlling for the other covariates. Propensity score matching restricts the available 
sample to treated and untreated cases that have comparable propensity scores. If there 
is no considerable overlap in the propensities of those in the treatment and the control 
group (like in most of our countries) the differences in educational achievement will 
not  reflect  the  average  treatment  effect  of  attending  a  private  school  for  the  full 
sample, but only for a selective part, namely those pupils who have the possibility to 
actually choose a private school. From this perspective, the results of propensity score 
matching  presented  here  should  be  seen  as  complementary  to  the  earlier  results, 
obtained through OLS regression.
The great advantage of using propensity scores lies in the fact that matching is 
performed  on  only  one  dimension  instead  of  the  all  the  variables  on  which  the 
propensity score is computed (in this case, 15 pupil and school variables). Because of 
the large number of predictors, matching on all of the variables simultaneously would 
be virtually impossible.  However, the same propensity score may result from very 
different values on the predictor variables entered in the logistic regression through 
which  the  propensity  score  is  estimated.5 To  account  for  this  possibility,  a  more 
sophisticated  propensity  matching  has  been  performed  using  both  the  propensity 
scores and the Mahalanobis distance. The algorithm involves two steps. The first one 
consists of selecting all the control cases (in this case, pupils attending public schools) 
that have a propensity score within a range of a quarter of a standard deviation below 
or  above  each  treatment  case  (in  this  case,  pupils  attending  private-independent 
schools). In a second step, for all the selected control cases in the previous stage, a 
Mahalanobis distance is computed based on five variables (highest parental education, 
highest parental  occupational status, family wealth, immigration status and cultural 
possessions  index).  These  five  variables  have  been  chosen  based  on  theoretical 
considerations,  i.e.  they are thought to play a particularly important  role in school 
choice selectivity (Ball 1993; Gorard 1999; Witte 2000). Eventually, the control case 
with the lowest Mahalanobis distance is chosen as a match. This type of matching 
allows for a greater weight to be assigned to the variables included in the Mahalanobis 
distance  matching.  Simultaneously,  it  ensures  that  pupils  attending  public  schools 
match (as close as possible) pupils attending private-independent schools not only on 
the propensity scores but also on the five social background variables on which the 
Mahalanobis distance is computed.
There are very few applications of propensity score matching in the study of 
the effects of private and public schools, but the first dates back more than 20 years 
and is used for the same topic: effectiveness differences between public and catholic 
schools in the USA (Hoffer, Greeley and Coleman, 1985; Morgan, 2001).
5. Data and Methods
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Our  analyses  are  carried  out  using  the  Programme  for  International  Student 
Assessment  (PISA)  survey.  This  dataset  has  the  particular  advantage  of  offering 
information both on school boards and funding sources. Thus, it enables us to make 
the  distinction  between  the  three  school  types  mentioned  above,  namely  public, 
private government independent and private government dependent.6 Other data-sets 
like  TIMSS and PRILS allow only for the distinction  between public  and private 
schools  and,  thus,  are  less  useful  given  the  already  established  differences  in 
effectiveness  between  private  government-independent  and  private  government-
dependent schools (Dronkers & Robert, 2008a). We restrict ourselves in this article to 
the  comparison  between  public  and  private-independent  schools.  In  Dronkers  & 
Avram (2010) we have made a comparable comparison between public and private-
dependent schools. 
Three waves of the PISA survey have been carried out so far, in 2000, 2003 
and  in  2006.  Use  has  been  made  of  all  three  waves  by  pooling  them  into  one 
database.7 This strategy allows us to maximize  the number  of private-independent 
schools present in the database. We selected all European countries, non-European 
industrialized countries, countries in Latin-America & Asia that have a minimum of 
10 private-independent schools present in the pooled dataset. We also discarded all 
countries in which the private-independent schools cater for less that 1 percent of the 
pupil population. 
Only the composite reading score has been used as a proxy for the student’s 
educational performance.  Albeit the math and science scores could also have been 
added to the analyses, we opted to exclude them due to the fact that in the first wave 
only part of the sample has been given (a shorter version of) the math and/or science 
test. Conversely,  the reading score is available for the entire sample in each of the 
three waves. Earlier analyses (compare the results of Dronkers & Robert (2008a) who 
use  reading  as  indicator  with  Dronkers  &  Robert  (2008b)  who  use  math  as  an 
indicator) have shown that differences in school achievement between school types 
are similar, irrespective of which of these three indicators of educational performance 
is used.
As PISA data are cross-sectional, they contain no information either about the 
pupils’  length  of  stay at  their  current  school,  or  about  the  characteristics  of  their 
former  schools.  This  might  lead  to  a  misspecification  of  the  effect  of  the 
characteristics of the current school, especially if all (or at least the large majority of) 
15 year old pupils in a specific country have moved recently to current school. 
Based on the existing literature relating to private-public school comparisons, 
as well as on availability of comparable data in the three waves of PISA, a variety of 
family  and  school  characteristics  likely  to  influence  school  choice  and  school 
effectiveness have been included in the analyses. Gender, immigrant status, cultural 
possessions, household wealth, both maternal and paternal education and occupational 
status have been incorporated to account for variations in the family background of 
private and public schools’ student populations.  Previous PISA based research has 
shown these variables  to be the most  powerful predictors  of student achievement. 
Unfortunately, parental income (separate from household wealth) is not available in 
all PISA waves, and therefore, has not been included in the analysis.
 The school’s  social  composition  (percentage  of  students  having at  least  a 
parent with a university degree), the school’s size, its admission policies (whether it 
considers  parental  endorsement  of  the  school’s  educational  philosophy,  and 
attendance of its  special  programs as criteria  when admitting students),  as well  as 
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variables  related  to  the  school’s  visible  resources,  namely  student-teacher  ratios, 
computer-student ratios and a composite index of educational resources have been 
considered as potential factors influencing school choice on the school level. All of 
the included school characteristics are relatively observable to parents and therefore 
may  play  a  role  in  shaping  choice  decisions.  We  did  not  include  those  school 
characteristics, which are less visible for parents (like teacher quality). Because they 
are not easily noticeable to parents, and thus are less amenable to clear assessments, 
the  influence  of  such  school  characteristics  might  be  more  random.  A  crucial 
characteristic of private-independent schools is their affordability, i.e. the amount of 
tuition they charge. Regrettably, apart from a raw variable indicating that the school 
does indeed charge student fees, no detailed information on tuition payments exists in 
PISA.  Since  all  private  independent  schools  charge  tuition,  the  binary  variable 
mentioned above could not be used.
Mean values for the characteristics of pupils, parents and schools are shown in 
Table 1, separately for each country that had enough private independent schools in 
the sample to be included in our analyses. 
 
[About here table 1] 
25 counties on four continents have enough public and private-independent 
schools  to  be  included  in  the  analyses,  although  in  some  cases,  the  private-
independent sector caters for a small percentage of all 15 year-olds (but always more 
than 1%). 
6. Results for the choice of private-independent schools versus public schools.
A set of 25 logistic regression equations including all the parent, pupil and 
visible  school  characteristics  presented  in  section  5  has  been  used  to  predict  the 
selection  of a private-dependent  school rather  than a public  one,  for each country 
separately. 
Table  2  shows  the  regression  coefficients  corresponding  to  each  of  these 
equations. Since we use multivariate regressions that simultaneously include all of the 
predictors, the resulting coefficients can be interpreted as ‘net’ effects on the school 
choice.
[About here table 2] 
The  results  indicate  that,  in  general,  the  choice  pattern  between  private-
independent and public schools differs across these 25 countries. More specifically, 
the influence of various student and school characteristics on the selection of a private 
independent  school rather  than a  public  one is  country specific.  School  admission 
based on parents’ endorsement of the school’s philosophy is positively influencing the 
likelihood  of  choosing  a  private-independent  school  in  all  countries,  with  the 
exception of the UK, Chile and Colombia.8 Admission policies based on participation 
in  a special  program are increasing  the likelihood of  attending a  public  school  in 
Austria,  Belgium,  Portugal,  Spain,  Israel,  Argentina,  Chile,  and Colombia.  On the 
contrary, such special program admission policies increase the chance of a private-
independent school option in Greece, Switzerland, UK, New Zealand, USA, Brazil, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Taiwan, Indonesia and Korea. A high score on the socio-economic 
composition of the student-body variable increases the chance of attending a private-
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independent  school  in  all  countries  except  Indonesia  and  Thailand  where  a  high 
student  composition  score  increases  the  probability  of  a  public  school  choice.  A 
higher number of teachers per student in schools impacts positively9 on the likelihood 
of  selecting  a private-independent  school  only in  Switzerland,  UK, Canada,  USA, 
Chile, Columbia and Mexico. But a higher number of teachers per student increase the 
odds of public school choice in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, New 
Zealand,  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Taiwan,  Indonesia  and  Korea.  The presence of 
additional educational resources favors the selection of a private independent school 
over a public one in the large majority of countries. The exceptions are France, Spain 
and Israel where there is no significant relation, as well as Greece and Peru where 
higher educational resources are associated with public schools.
The influence of student characteristics on the likelihood of selecting a private 
independent school over a public one similarly differs across countries. Thus, children 
of parents with higher occupational status tend to opt for private independent schools 
in Austria, Spain, Colombia, Uruguay, Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan (only the mother’s 
SES is significant),  Canada,  New Zealand,  Peru,  Korea  (only the father’s SES is 
significant), Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, UK, USA and Brazil (both the mother’s 
and the father’s SES are significant). However, in France, Italy, Portugal, Mexico and 
Thailand  there  is  no  relation  between  parental  SES  and  the  choice  of  a  private-
independent  school,  whereas in  Argentina  a  negative  relation  has been found. 
Confirming previous research, family wealth positively impacts the likelihood of a 
private independent school choice in an overwhelming majority ofcountries. Belgium, 
Portugal, Switzerland, USA, Argentina, Columbia, Peru and Japan  differ in that  no 
statistically significant relationship can be detected, while in Israel the relationship is 
negative. Finally, the parental educational level is generally unrelated to the likelihood 
of selecting  a  private independent school once the other student and school 
characteristics are controlled for. The pattern does not hold in Austria, Greece, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, and the USA where parents of higher educational background prefer 
public schools over private independent ones. The opposite is true for Thailand. 
Private independent schools have sometimes been regarded as “elite” schools catering 
for the needs of upper class families. Indeed, such “elite schools have been very 
visible in educational systems following the Anglo-Saxon model. Nevertheless, our 
results indicate that this pattern is far from universal. On the contrary, in the majority 
of countries, there is little evidence that private independent school selection is 
reserved exclusively for upper class parents. 
Native  parents10 prefer  public  schools  in  Belgium,  France,  Spain,  while 
immigrant parents prefer private-independent schools in Portugal, Switzerland, UK, 
Canada, USA, Colombia and Thailand. Pupils who speak a foreign language at home 
are more likely to attend a private-independent school in Belgium, Portugal, UK and 
Israel,  but  not  in  Italy,  Canada,  New Zealand,  USA and Thailand.  Hence, private 
independent schools cannot be said to generally  constitute  a  segregationist 
mechanism, used by indigenous parents and pupils to isolate themselves from children 
with an immigrant background.
[About here figure 1]
In the face of such huge variation in the effect of student and school characteristics on 
the choice between public and private-independent schools in the various countries, 
easy  characterisations,  such  as  choice  always  being  driven  by  class,  educational 
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capital,  fear  of  immigrants,  wealth,  school  resources  or  selectivity,  are  simply 
misleading. 
In an attempt to systematize the variation in the effects of various pupil and school 
characteristics across countries, we have made use cluster analysis, using the country 
regression coefficients11 as  input.  Figure 1 shows the country groupings that  have 
emerged  from the  hierarchical  cluster  analysis.12 Countries  where  coefficients  are 
more  similar  are  clustered  closer  together,  while  countries  with  more  divergent 
coefficients are placed further away from each other. The cluster analysis suggests the 
existence of two general clusters. The first cluster (A) consists of Austria, Canada, 
Switzerland, USA, Italy, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, Uruguay, Greece and UK. Table 
3 shows that the private-independent schools in these eleven countries are chosen by 
native  language  speaking  pupils  from more  wealthy  families  who choose  private-
independent schools for their high socioeconomic school composition and the special 
programs of these schools. One might characterize the private-independent school-
choice in these countries as a social class reproduction choice. The second cluster (B) 
contains  Belgium,  Portugal,  Israel,  Chile,  Taiwan,  Japan,  Spain,  Argentina  and 
Columbia. Table 3 shows that the private-independent schools in these nine countries 
are  chosen  by  foreign  language  speaking  pupils  from  less  wealthy  families  who 
choose schools with many material  resources.  One might  characterize  the private-
independent  school-choice  in  these  countries  as  an  outsider’s  choice  for  a  well-
equipped school. 
[About here table 3]
One can also discern smaller clusters in order to distinguish a more nuanced typology 
of choice for public or private-independent schools. The first cluster (A1) contains 
Austria, Canada, Switzerland, and USA. Table 3 shows that the private-independent 
schools in these four countries are chosen by pupils based on the schools’ policies of 
requiring  parental  endorsement  of  their  educational  philosophy,  as  an  admission 
criterion.  One  might  characterize  the  private-independent  school-choice  in  these 
countries as an  educational philosophy choice. The second cluster (A2) consists of 
Italy,  Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil  and Uruguay.  Results  in Table 3 indicate that the 
private-independent  schools  in  these five countries  are  chosen by native  language 
speaking  pupils  from  wealthy  families.  One  might  characterize  the  private-
independent  school-choice  in  these  countries  as  the  choice  of  the  rich.  The  third 
cluster (A3) consists of Greece and UK. Coefficients displayed in Table 3 suggest that 
the  private-independent  schools  in  these two countries  are  chosen by pupils  from 
cultural-rich  families  who  choose  private-independent  schools  for  their  high 
socioeconomic  school  composition,  the  special  programs of  these  schools  and the 
material  equipment  they  are  endowed  with.  One  might  characterize  the  private-
independent school-choice in these countries as  the choice of the cultural elite. The 
fourth  cluster  (B4)  contains  Belgium,  Portugal,  Israel,  Chile,  Taiwan,  Japan  and 
Spain. Table 3 shows that the private-independent schools in these seven countries use 
parental endorsement of their respective educational philosophy to select students and 
have  on  average  more  educational  resources.  One  might  characterize  the  private-
independent school-choice in these seven countries as a choice of  the cultural rich  
parent.  The last  and fifth  cluster  (B5) contains  Argentina  and Columbia.  Table  3 
shows  that  the  private-independent  schools  in  these  two  countries  are  chosen  by 
immigrants’  children  speaking  foreign  languages  at  home,  who  choose  private-
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independent  schools  for  their  high  socioeconomic  school  composition  and  their 
material and educational resources. One might characterize the private-independent 
school-choice in these countries as a choice of the foreigner in poor countries. 
To sum up, there is a substantial amount of variation in the impact of student and 
school  characteristics  on  school  choice  processes  across  countries.  Private-
independent  school  choice  cannot  simply  be  explained  through  better  teaching 
conditions  (material  and  educational  resources  of  schools;  a  high  socio-economic 
composition of the student body).  Preferences for a special  educational philosophy 
and the maintenance of cultural capital represent important motives in some countries. 
Not only native parents but also immigrant  parents can prefer private-independent 
schools,  given  the  characteristics  of  the  public  schools.  The  above  mentioned 
variation  points  out  the  differential  role  that  public  and  private  schools  play, 
depending on a country’s educational system.
7.  The  effectiveness  in  reading  achievement  of  private-independent  schools 
compared to that of public schools
In this section we present the results from the second step of the propensity score 
matching. We only compare pupils who have relatively similar risks (or propensities) 
to attend a private-independent rather than a public school. We exclude those pupils in 
private-independent  schools  who  have  no  comparable  (i.e.  with  a  similar  risk  of 
attending a private independent school) counterparts in a public school. This strategy 
leads  to  the  loss  of  a  fairly  large number  of  pupils  in  the sample,  particularly in 
countries where the private-independent sector is small or obviously skewed towards 
the  better-off  families.13 Table  4  summarizes  the  results  of  our  analyses  and  the 
number of matched pupils.
[About here table 4] 
The first column of the table presents the raw average difference in reading scores 
between pupils in private-independent schools and public schools, without any control 
for  covariates.  Given the school-choice  selectivity  discussed  in  section  6,  it  is  no 
surprise that pupils of private-independent schools in nearly all countries have higher 
readings scores on average (except Italy and Switzerland). Quite surprisingly though, 
pupils  of  private-independent  schools  in  Taiwan,  Indonesia  and  Japan  score 
significantly lower compared to those in public schools. The second column shows 
the number of pupils involved in this simple comparison. Because these differences 
are not controlled for school-choice selectivity and parental background effects, they 
cannot be said to accurately reflect differences in school effectiveness. Instead, they 
might only reflect school-choice selectivity.
Therefore, in the next step, we match each pupil attending a private-dependent 
school to one with a similar propensity score but attending a public school. Note that, 
the actual level of the propensity score is irrelevant for the construction of the match, 
as long as the pupils of matched pair have the same propensity score (low or high), 
but  attend  different  school  types.  This  restriction  strongly  reduces  the  number  of 
pupils/cases, as illustrated in column 4, but the difference in the reading scores of the 
matched pupils (column 3) gives now a more valid indication of the true discrepancies 
in school effectiveness between private-independent and public schools. Significant 
positive  differences  in  the  average  reading  score  of  pupils  attending  private 
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independent and public schools respectively are registered only in Belgium, Greece, 
Canada,  Israel  and Peru.  After  matching,  pupils  of  private-independent  schools  in 
Switzerland,  Mexico,  Taiwan  and  Japan  score  significantly  lower  than  their 
counterparts  in  public  schools.  In  the  remaining  countries  the  differences  in  the 
reading score between pupils of private-independent schools and public schools is no 
longer statistically significant.  Note control of school-choice induced by selectivity 
(realized  through  the  propensity  score  matching)  changed  the  results  for  many 
countries. Most often, once the propensity score is controlled for, differences in the 
average  reading  score  between  private  independent  and  public  schools  become 
statistically  insignificant.  This shows that  controlling  for the selectivity of school-
choice is important for unmasking ‘true’ school effects. 
Although propensity score matching has the advantage of requiring matching 
on only one dimension,  i.e.  the propensity score,  it  has the drawback that  similar 
propensity scores can be the result of different combinations of parent, student and 
school characteristics. To further verify our results, we have used propensity score 
matching with Mahalanobis distance on a few key student background indicators. The 
Mahalanobis  distance  matching  allows  for  a  greater  weight  to  be assigned to  the 
variables on which the distance is computed. We chose to include five variables in the 
Mahalanobis  distance  computations,  namely  highest  parental  education,  highest 
parental  occupational  status,  family  wealth,  immigration  status  and  cultural 
possessions  index.  This  more  refined  analysis  which  combines  matching  on  the 
propensity score together with additional controls for the five covariates (column 6) 
does not change the results much, compared with the analysis based on the simple 
nearest neighbour propensity score matching (column 4). After applying this (stricter) 
form of control for school-choice induced selectivity, significant positive differences 
in the reading score between pupils of private-independent and public schools persist 
in Belgium, Greece, Canada, Brazil, and Peru. Pupils of private-independent schools 
in Mexico, Taiwan, Japan and Thailand score significantly lower than pupils in public 
schools. In the remaining sixteen countries, the differences in reading scores between 
pupils of the two school sectors are not significant. 
Finally, no apparent relationship could be established between school choice 
and  school  effectiveness  processes  (Table  4).  Both  clusters  derived  based  on  the 
choice patterns contained countries with a more effective private-independent sector, 
as well as countries where the public sector is more successful in raising the reading 
achievement of its pupils.
8. School Choice and School Effectiveness 
Propensity  score  matching  can  provide  a  useful  tool  to  differentiate  between  the 
effects of school choice and those of school effectiveness. Making this distinction is 
crucial for a valid estimation of the school sector differentials in effectiveness, i.e. the 
gains  in  achievement  that  are  brought  about  by the  school  itself  rather  than  as  a 
consequence of its student intake. 
The  choice  of  private-independent  schools  in  these  25  countries  varies  by 
school  characteristics,  especially  school  composition,  school-size,  the  school’s 
admission criteria (both parental endorsement of the school’s values and participation 
in special programs) and educational resources. We found two overarching patterns of 
private-independent school choice. The first one can be characterized as a social class  
reproduction choice.  Private-independent  schools in the countries  which belong to 
this  cluster are chosen by native language speaking pupils from wealthier  families 
11
who  choose  private-independent  schools  for  their  high  socioeconomic  school 
composition and the special programs that these schools run. The second one might be 
summarized  as  the  choice  of the  outsiders  for  a  well-equipped  school. Private-
independent schools in the countries belonging to this cluster are chosen by foreign 
language speaking pupils from less wealthy families who choose schools with higher 
material resources. Within these two large groups, one can also distinguish smaller 
sub-clusters:  three  within  the  first  cluster  encompassing  countries  where  private 
independent schools are a  social class reproduction choice (educational philosophy  
choice;  choice of the rich; choice of the cultural elite) and two within the second 
cluster grouping countries where private independent schools constitute an outsider  
strategy (the cultural rich parent; foreigner in poor countries). However, the main 
finding is that the choice in favour of a private-independent school varies between 
countries indicating that private-independent schools do not fulfil the same function 
everywhere.  Generalizing Anglo-Saxon examples of private-independent schools to 
other countries is simply wrong and misleading. 
We  have  also  found  a  large  variation  in  the  effectiveness  of  private-
independent schools across countries. After having taken into account the differences 
between  the  private-independent  and  public  sectors  generated  by  school  choice 
processes, pupils at private-independent schools in Austria, Brazil, Canada, Greece, 
Israel, Peru and Switzerland still achieved significantly higher than their counterparts 
in  the  public  sector.  In  these  seven  countries  the  observed  higher  reading  scores 
cannot be explained by the school choice processes. The result might be an indication 
of a higher effectiveness of private-independent schools in these countries. However 
in Japan, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand, pupils at private-independent schools scored 
significantly lower on the reading test than pupils in the public sector. Thus, in these 
four  countries,  the  school  choice  processes  hide  the  actual  lower  effectiveness  of 
private-independent  schools,  compared  to  the  higher  effectiveness  of  the  public 
sector. Religious or ethnic motives might explain the parental preference for private-
dependent  schools,  despite  their  lower  effectiveness.  But  also  private-independent 
schools  might  be  a  “second  choice”  for  parents  if  their  child  fails  to  pass  the 
competitive  entrance  examination to the public schools.  In the remaining fourteen 
countries,  school  choice  processes  explain  the  observed  higher  or  lower  average 
reading scores of private-independent schools compared to those of public schools. 
Interestingly,  no relationship  between the  clusters  of  a  private-independent  school 
choice and the relative effectiveness of the private independent sector in comparison 
with the public one could be detected. 
Our findings contradict neo-liberal theories related to school choice and school 
effectiveness  at  least  on  two  counts.  On  the  one  hand,  we  could  not  find  any 
correlation,  at  the  country  level,  between  school  choice  and  school  effectiveness 
patterns.  The  lack  of  a  choice-effectiveness  link  contradicts  the  existence  of  a 
universal consumer logic operating in school markets, whereby parents always choose 
the most effective schools for their children. In fact, in four countries parents chose to 
send their children to a private-independent school  despite the lower success of this 
type of schools in raising achievement. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  could  not  find  any  universal  private-independent 
schooling advantage. On the contrary, in the majority of the countries included in the 
analyses, we found no significant difference between the scores of pupils of private-
independent  and  public  schools,  once  appropriate  controls  have  been  introduced. 
These results partly confirm those of Dronkers & Robert (2008a; 2008b). They found, 
using  a  usual  OLS  multi-level  regression  containing  corrections  for  student 
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background variables and school composition, that private-independent schools were 
less effective than public schools in all countries. This finding is not confirmed in this 
study,  as  we find higher  achievement  scores  in  the  private-independent  sector  for 
some of the countries included in the analysis. However, our study contains a wider 
variation  of  countries  than  the  range  Dronkers  and  Robert  (2008a)  analyzed, 
especially due to including more countries outside Europe. 
But the findings of our study also indicate that we cannot simply dismiss the 
higher  effectiveness  of  private-independent  schools,  at  least  in  some countries,  by 
referring  solely  to  the  selectivity  argument.  Private-independent  schools  remain 
significantly more effective than comparable public schools, in some countries, even 
after complex adjustments and controls for their student intake.
 Cross-national variation in both choice and effectiveness patterns related to 
the private sector points to the potential role played by country specific institutional 
and  social  factors.  Dissimilarities  in  the  general  education  system  containing  the 
private sector give rise to divergent opportunities and constraints to which private-
independent  schools  must  adapt.  Also  differences  in  the  religious  and  ethnic 
composition of public and private schools in the various countries (a factor which we 
could not take into account) might explain these cross-national variations in choice 
and  effectiveness.  Moreover,  in  some  countries,  the  cleavage  between public  and 
private-independent schools might be deep for still relevant historical reasons, while 
in  other  countries  students  move  now  easily  from  public  to  private-independent 
schools, or vice versa. 
Further cross-national  analyses are needed to pinpoint the exact institutions 
and  legacies  that  are  involved  in  moulding  both  school  choice  and  school 
effectiveness between the private and the public sectors. 
Notes
13
Literature
Alexander, K. L. and A. M. Pallas. 1983. "Private Schools and Public Policy: New Evidence on 
Cognitive Achievement in Public and Private Schools" Sociology of Education 56:170-182.
Ball, S. J. 1993. "Education Markets, Choice and Social Class: The Market as a Class Strategy in 
the UK and the USA" British Journal of Sociology of Education 14:3-19.
Ball, S. J. 1997. "On the cusp: parents choosing between state and private schools in the UK: 
action within an economy of symbolic goods"  International Journal of Inclusive Education 
1:1-17.
Ball, S. J., R. Bowe and S. Gewirtz. 1995. "Circuits of schooling: A sociological exploration of 
parental choice of school in social class contexts" Sociological Review 43: 52-78.
Bryk,  A.  S.,  V.  E.  Lee  and P.  B.  Holland.  1993.  Catholic  schools  and the  common good. 
Cambridge (Mass.)/ London: Harvard University Press.
Chubb J. E and T. M. Moe. 1990.  Politics, Markets and America's Schools. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Coleman, J.S. and T. Hoffer. 1987. Public and private high schools. The impact of communities. 
New York: Basic Books.
Coleman, J. S.,  T. B. Hoffer and S. Kilgore. 1982. High school achievement: Public, Catholic  
and other private schools compared. New York: Basic Books.
Corten,  R. and J.  Dronkers.  2006. "School  Achievement  of Pupils  from the Lower Strata  in 
Public,  Private  Government-Dependent  and  Private  Government-Independent  Schools:  A 
cross-national  test  of  the  Coleman-Hoffer  thesis"  Educational  Research  and  Evaluation  
12:179-208.
Dehejia,  R.  and W. Sadek.  2002.  “Propensity  score matching methods  for  non-experimental 
causal studies” Review of Economics and Statistics 84:151-161.
Dronkers, J. and S. Avram. 2010. “A Cross-national Analysis of the Relations between School 
Choice  and  Effectiveness  Differences  between  Private-Dependent  and  Public  Schools” 
Educational Research and Evaluation 16:151-176. 
Dronkers, J. and P. Robert. 2004. "Has educational sector any impact on school effectiveness in 
Hungary? A comparison of the public and the newly established religious grammar schools" 
European Societies 6:205-236.
Dronkers, J. and P. Robert. 2008a. "Differences in Scholastic Achievement of Public, Private 
Government-Dependent  and  Private-independent  Schools:  A  Cross-National  Analysis" 
Educational Policy 22:541-577. 
Dronkers, J. & P. Robert. 2008b. "School Choice in the Light of the Effectiveness Differences of 
Various  Types  of  Public  and Private  Schools  in  19  OECD Countries"  Journal  of  School  
Choice 2:260-301.
Echols,  F.  H. and J.  D. Willms.  1995. "Reasons for School Choice in Scotland"  Journal of  
Education Policy 10:143-156.
Gamoran, A. 1996. "Student Achievement in Public Magnet, Public Comprehensive, and Private 
City High Schools" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 18:1-18.
Godwin,  R.  K.  and  F.  R.  Kemerer.  2002.  School  Choice  Tradeoffs.  Liberty,  Equity,  and  
Diversity. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Goldring, E. B. and K. J. R. Phillips. 2008. "Parent preferences and parent choice: the public-
private decision about school choice" Journal of Education Policy 23: 209-230.
Gorard,  S.  1999.  "Planning  Ahead  in  a  'Market'  for  Schools:  Predicting  Patterns  of  School 
Choice" Evaluation and Research in Education 13:132-143.
Goyette, K. 2008. "Race, Social Background, and School Choice Options" Equity & Excellence  
in Education 41:114-129.
Greeley,  A.  M.  1982.  Catholic  High  Schools  and  Minority  Students. New  Brunswick: 
Transaction Books.
Hoffer, T. B. 1998. "Social Background and Achievement in Public and Catholic High Schools" 
Social Psychology of Education 2:7-23.
Hoffer,  T.,  A.  M.  Greeley,  and  J.  S.  Coleman.  1985.  “Achievement  Growth  in  Public  and 
Catholic Schools” Sociology of Education 58:74-97.
Jarvis,  H.  and  S.  Alvanides.  2008.  "School  choice  from  a  household  resource  perspective: 
Preliminary findings from a north of England case study" Community, Work & Family 11:385-
403.
Jeynes,  W.  2002.  "Educational  Policy  and  Effects  of  Attending  a  Religious  School  on  the 
Academic Achievement of Children" Educational Policy 16:406-424.
Langouët,  G.  and A. Léger.  1994.  École publique ou école privée? Trajectoires  et  réussites  
scolaires. Paris: Editions Fabert.
Morgan, S. L. 2001. "Counterfactuals, causal effect heterogeneity, and the Catholic school effect 
on learning" Sociology of Education 74:341-374.
Morgan,  S.  L.  and  C.  Winship.  2007.  Counterfactuals  and  Causal  Inference.  Methods  and  
Principles for Social Research. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Neal,  D. 1997. "The Effects  of Catholic  Secondary Schooling on Educational  Achievement" 
Journal of Labor Economics 15:98-123.
Noell,  J.  1982. "Public  and Catholic  Schools:  A Reanalysis  of "Public  and Private  Schools" 
Sociology of Education 55:123-132.
Rosenbaum, O.D. and D. Rubin. 1983. "The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies of causal effects“ Biometrika 70:41-55.
Sammons, P., J. Hillman and P. Mortimore. 1995.  Key characteristics of effective schools: A  
review  of  school  effectiveness  research.  London:  Office  for  Standards  in  Education  and 
Institute of Education.
Scheerens, J. and R. Bosker. 1997.  The Foundations of Educational Effectiveness. Kidlington 
/New York /Toyko: Pergamon.
Somers, M.-A., P. J.McEwan and J. D. Willms. 2004. “How Effective Are Private Schools in 
Latin America?” Comparative Education Review 48:48-69
Teddlie, C. and D. Reynolds. 2000. The international handbook of school effectiveness research. 
London: Falmer.
Vandenberghe, V. and S. Robin. 2004. "Evaluating the effectiveness of private education across 
countries: a comparison of methods" Labour Economics 11:487-506.
Willms, J. D. 1985. "Catholic-School Effects on Academic Achievement: New Evidence From 
the High School and Beyond Follow-up Study" Sociology of Education 58:98-114.
Witte, J. F. 2000. The Market Approach to Education. An Analysis of America's First Voucher  
Program. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Yang,  P.  and  N.  Kayaardi  2004.  "Who  chooses  non-public  schools  for  their  children?" 
Educational Studies 30:231-249.
15
Figure 1 Clusters of choice patterns of private-independent schools versus public school.
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Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country
Austria Belgium France Greece Italy Portugal Spain Switzer
land
UK Canada Israel New
Zeelan
d
USA
Private independent 2.79 1.59 7.87 4.13 2.1 2.1 6.9 2.89 3.87 3.66 5.44 4.39 6.53
Private dependent 6.52 67.58 14.24 0 2.91 6.17 35.66 0.87 0.61 2.81 17.19 0.02 0.53
Public 90.7 30.83 77.89 95.87 94.99 91.73 57.44 96.24 95.52 93.53 77.37 95.6 92.94
Gender (% girls) 49.77 48.2 50.74 50.18 50.58 52.41 50.57 48.89 50.42 50.72 53.03 49.94 50.35
Grade (average) 9.47 9.63 9.48 10.07 9.84 9.36 9.67 8.84 10.91 9.82 9.9 10.63 9.8
Grade (range) 6 to 11 7 to 12 7 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 11 5 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 12 9 to 12 7 to 12 7 to 12 8 to 13 7 to 12
Immigrant (% ) 17.39 22.47 24.03 12.12 8.22 12.26 7.43 36.99 13.39 18.7 38.09 35.75 20.47
First generation immigrant (%) 8.02 6.57 2.87 6.12 3.2 3.31 3.63 12.15 3.3 5.55 10.72 15.64 6.66
Second generation immigrant (%) 9.37 15.9 21.16 6 5.02 8.96 3.8 24.46 10.09 13.15 27.36 20.11 13.82
Foreign language used at home (%) 8.27 13.6 5.12 2.99 12.1 1.66 1.58 12.96 2.49 6.23 11.08 9.14 10.71
Index of cultural possessions (average) 0.01 -0.3 -0.3 0.15 0.22 -0.09 0.18 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09 0.06 -0.17 -0.1
Family wealth (average) 0.26 0.14 -0.15 -0.28 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.1 0.36 0.28 -0.04 0.3 0.31
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Austria Belgium France Greece Italy Portugal Spain Switzer
land
UK Canada Israel New
Zealan
d
USA
ISCED 0/1 2.47 5.87 3.19 9.51 5.46 32.71 18.62 5.54 2.36 1.85 4.19 5.3 3.11
ISECD 2 7.49 7.65 4.87 19.07 29.1
7
22.23 23.56 20.49 6.74 6.89 5.1 8.13 5.6
ISECD 3 b. c 38.46 8.77 23.98 7.86 11.6
1
11.36 6.48 28.57 24.5
6
0 7.8 20.28 2.11
ISCED 3a. 4 27.38 25.56 20.36 26.64 30.4
4
11.11 21.73 18.99 25.7
5
40.49 19.01 22.58 36.51
ISCED 5 b 13.61 27.61 15.14 14.8 10.7
1
8.16 9.28 14.47 16.9
3
22.49 24.7 18.16 24.15
ISCED 5a. 6 10.59 24.54 32.45 22.13 12.1
2
14.43 20.34 11.94 23.6
7
28.27 39.2 25.53 28.52
ISCED 0/1 1.71 5.46 2.85 11.03 6.31 32.96 19.06 4.58 3.44 3.42 4.18 6.07 3.74
ISECD 2 5.8 7.12 5.35 18.11 28.5
8
22.37 20.35 17.65 10.3
4
10.99 6.14 7.78 6.61
ISECD 3 b. c 34.03 7.73 21.61 9.38 9.19 11.95 6.27 25.31 26.1
4
0 9.87 14.6 2.23
ISCED 3a. 4 21.45 26.66 24.01 21.98 32.3
2
10.64 20.43 11.9 23.5
6
41.3 16.95 33.4 37.54
ISCED 5 b 21.61 22.44 9.7 12.49 9.73 7.91 11.66 19.91 11.5
5
16.85 25.26 10.88 20.49
ISCED 5a. 6 15.4 30.59 36.49 27.01 13.8
6
14.16 22.24 20.65 24.9
7
27.44 37.6 27.27 29.39
ISCED 0/1 0.87 3.1 1.77 4.87 2.05 26.33 12.12 3 1.41 0.86 2.12 3.18 1.92
ISECD 2 3.39 3.88 2.73 12.59 20.7
9
20.18 16.81 13.44 4.35 3.77 3.13 4.08 3.71
ISECD 3 b. c 27.73 5.53 14.88 7.6 9.43 12.46 5.86 22.92 19.2
1
0 5.89 12.36 1.48
ISCED 3a. 4 24.69 23.75 21.67 24.83 35.9
4
12.7 22.64 14.61 23.7
2
33.58 14.57 26.66 31.28
ISCED 5 b 24.23 26.8 14.61 16.02 12.7
9
8.76 13.15 21.29 17.4
5
23.48 25.23 17.47 22.93
ISCED 5a. 6 19.1 36.94 44.33 34.09 18.9
9
19.58 29.42 24.75 33.8
5
38.31 49.05 36.24 38.69
Mother SES (average) 41.82 43.67 42.57 45.02 43.4
4
37.98 39.74 41.45 43.4
3
46.71 51.05 46.41 48.1
Father SES (average) 44.31 46.1 44.11 43.6 42.7
8
40.51 42.64 44.57 44.7
2
44.33 50 44.83 46.22
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Austria Belgium France Greece Italy Portugal Spain Switzer
land
UK Canada Israel New
Zealan
d
USA
value reading (average) 496.14 510.72 503.2 467.11 485.83 476.52 484.93 494.87 508.78 514.45 451.29 524.32 495.03
Girl schools% 1.79 0.35 0 0.14 0.1 0 0.23 0.42 7.44 0.63 13.4 16.34 1.39
Boy schools% 1.15 0.92 0 0.45 1.41 0.05 0.91 0.11 5.23 0.43 9.43 13.15 1.02
Mixed schools % 97.06 98.73 100 99.42 98.49 99.95 98.85 99.47 87.33 98.94 77.16 70.51 97.59
Social composition (% parent's having tertiary 
education)-(average)
19.04 36.57 44.08 34.09 18.96 19.57 29.34 24.71 33.48 38.29 48.9 35.9 38.58
School size 586.45 693.13 892.09 284.12 664.88 974.41 709.66 455.52 978.81 756.66 831.83 1095.14 1321.84
Admission-parents' endorsement of the school’s 
educational philosophy - %
45.85 71.92 91.85 34.54 35.1 56.57 44.86 31.25 46.84 28.34 75.02 45.58 36.06
Admittance-special programs considered- % 79.26 69.96 100 61.22 76.89 86.04 53.94 59.72 57.32 72.69 88.91 73.18 71.87
Teacher-student ratio 12.23 9.49 12.55 9.43 8.97 9.6 12.8 11.95 15.03 16.35 13.03 15.14 15.38
Computer-student ratio (average) 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.24 151.4 0.22 0.28
Educational resources (average) 0.21 -0.09 -0.49 0.16 0.21 -0.18 0.01 0.33 0.25 -0.03 -0.03 0.18 0.2
Teacher shortage -neg scale (average) -0.49 0.22 -0.32 0.18 0.14 -0.47 -0.55 -0.23 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.3 -0.07
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Taiwan Indonesia Japan Korea Thailand
Private independent 7.25 10.22 11.88 12.52 9.77 9.7 20.5 40.08 29.38 27.06 22.7 6.71
Private-dependent 23.07 0 39.67 3.7 0.09 1.62 0 0 4.37 0.61 28.44 4.32
Public 69.69 89.78 48.45 83.78 90.14 88.68 79.5 59.92 66.25 72.33 48.86 88.97
Gender (% girls) 53.75 53.61 49.85 54.38 53.77 50.79 49.84 47.57 50.49 49.99 44.99 57.56
Grade (average) 9.63 8.46 9.68 9.59 9.75 9.35 9.45 9.69 9.29 10 9.99 9.55
Grade (range) 7 to14 7 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 12 7 to 11 7 to 11 8 to 11 7 to 12 10 9 to 11 7 to11
Immigrant (% ) 7.01 1.67 1.72 1.32 2.87 1.33 4.11 2.25 0.52 0.79 0.04 0.78
First generation immigrant (%) 0.95 0.23 0.65 0.22 1.55 0.29 1.2 0.41 0.21 0.25 0 0.1
Second generation immigrant (%) 6.06 1.45 1.07 1.09 1.33 1.04 2.91 1.84 0.31 0.54 0.04 0.69
Foreign language used at home (%) 0.58 0.57 0.44 0.38 1.2 1.22 1.89 0.55 24.75 0.27 0.1 30.51
Index of cultural possessions (Average) -0.07 -0.24 -0.12 0.03 -0.49 0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.6 -0.4 0.15 -0.1
Family wealth (Average) -1.18 -1.35 -0.96 -1.67 -1.15 -1.75 -0.65 -0.2 -1.84 -0.18 -0.12 -1.22
ISCED 0/1 Mother education 18.1 35.15 9.02 35.75 36.53 4.11 26.86 9.73 37.05 1.91 7.15 41.57
ISECD 2 22.54 25.85 18.85 17.54 25.65 37 8.36 20.5 25.46 4.89 14.95 29.89
ISECD 3 b.c 7.82 5.46 15.17 0 3.44 16.26 0.9 0 6.32 11.24 17.63 4.52
ISCED 3a. 4 9.6 11.07 23.93 13.59 9.68 0 12.09 0 20.38 35.05 30.87 11.7
ISCED 5 b 19.49 8.02 18.29 17.01 10.56 23.79 22.01 59.5 3.89 25.52 13.1 1.24
ISCED 5a. 6 22.47 23.44 14.73 16.11 14.15 18.84 19.78 10.27 6.91 21.4 16.3 11.09
ISCED 0/1 Father education 19.66 27.88 8 35.96 31.4 1.3 27.81 7.97 28.78 3.78 5.65 36.61
ISECD 2 22.88 24.59 17.56 14.62 24.47 24.45 20 19.93 23.1 7.55 11.6 27.7
ISECD 3 b.c 8.62 5.63 14.85 0 3.62 15.38 2 0 8.79 13.24 16.32 6.19
ISCED 3a. 4 10.5 10.39 23.55 13.44 9.92 0 10.11 55.42 23.82 26.59 24.83 14.77
ISCED 5 b 17.12 9.4 16.97 16.51 12.28 29.87 23.73 0 4.86 8.06 12.64 2.29
ISCED 5a. 6 21.22 22.11 19.07 19.47 18.31 29 16.35 16.69 10.65 40.78 28.96 12.43
Mother SES (average) 43 37.23 33.82 39.86 41.28 38.78 41.59 45 33.96 46.61 41.18 33.34
FATHER SES (average) 41.86 38.17 38.69 39.85 39.29 38.52 42.14 46.01 34.16 44.87 44.37 34.72
value reading (Average) 403.48 391.58 432.18 390.3 424.86 334.57 423.58 506.67 377.15 507.68 536.61 429.48
Girl schools% 1.76 0.1 7.16 1.45 0.29 18.54 0 4.45 0.56 8.04 35.32 2.95
Boy schools% 1.2 0.08 5.48 0.8 0.09 0 0 0.43 1.44 5.35 18.4 0.41
Mixed schools % 97.03 99.82 87.36 97.75 99.61 81.46 100 95.12 98 86.61 46.28 96.65
Social composition (% parent's having tertiary 31.44 25.69 23.56 33.84 26.18 18.58 43.81
20
education)-average 31.15 24.27 13.08 31.3 15.18
School size 631.4 1215.75 1092.53 1765.75 892.92 1140.64 461.9 2264.98 635.55 863.95 1198.09 1687.19
Admission-parents' endorsement of the 
school’s educational philosophy 67.06 53.15 62.65 90.17 89.92 100 33.46 72.88 72.8 52.76 40.27 80.39
Admittance-special programs 83.9 53.65 77.41 54.54 24.66 84.15 19.39 54.3 77.28 49.6 60.25 89.26
Teacher-student ratio 10.2 52.03 26.91 64.98 57.1 100 42.43 65.85 18.49 78.5 17.72 22.49
Computer-student ratio 80.9 32.42 51.68 24.95 29.13 23.3 16.48 17.46 19.25 14.03 0.25 1.8
Educational resources -0.03 0.09 -0.16 0.12 0.09 273.61 0.06 0.2 -0.58 0.19 0.16 -0.1
Teacher shortage (neg scale) -0.58 -0.57 0.19 -1.13 -0.53 1.18 -0.63 0.66 0.96 0.14 -0.49 0.66
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000. 2003 and 2006.
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 Table 2: The coefficients of the logistic regression predicting the choice of a private-independent school relative to a public school per country. 
including tuition.
Regressi
on 
coefficie
nts 
Gender 
(male)
Immigra
nt (First 
or 
second 
generatio
n)
Foreign 
language 
used at 
home
Cultural 
possessio
ns
Family 
wealth
Mother 
ISCED
Father 
ISCED
Mother 
SES
Father 
SES
School-
soc 
composit
ion
School 
size
Admissi
on-
parents' 
endorse
ment of 
the 
school’s 
educatio
nal 
philosop
hy
Admissi
on- 
special 
program
Student-
teacher 
ratio
Compute
r-student 
ratio
Educatio
nal 
resources
Constant
EUROPE
Austria 0.770* 
(0.144)
0.0006 
(0.233)
-0.448 
(0. 383)
0.004 
(0.083)
0.180* 
(0.093)
-0.180* 
(0.074)
0.010 
(0.071)
0.014* 
(0.005)
0.002 
(0.005)
5.992* 
(0.419)
-0.005* 
(0.000)
2.313* 
(0.272)
-0.947* 
(0.338)
0.106* 
(0.013)
1.531* 
(0.380) 0.207* 
(0.077)
-6.325 
(0.496)
Belgium 0.578* 
(0.153)
-1.642* 
(0.264)
0.901* 
(0.252)
0.293* 
(0.084)
0.020 
(0.096)
-0.046 
(0.068)
-0.036 
(0.068)
0.013* 
(0.005)
0.016* 
(0.005)
1.424* 
(0.443)
-0.0009* 
(0.0003)
4.798* 
( 0.419)
-1.190* 
(0.162)
0.054* 
(0.015)
5.090* 
(0.585)
0.443* 
(0.072)
-9.080 
(0.669)
France -0.080 
(0.150)
-0.547* 
(0.225)
0.441 
(0.456)
0.021 
(0.083)
0.266* 
(0.110)
0.025 
(0.070)
-0.084 
(0.068)
0.008 
(0.005)
-0.009 
(0.005)
3.813* 
(0.513)
-0.001* 
(0.0002)
Dropped 
†
Dropped 
†
-0.018 
(0.028)
-4.947* 
(1.370) 0.016 
(0.083)
-1.691 
(0.649)
Greece -0.071 
(0.206)
-0.094 
(0.320)
-2.436 
(1.607)
-0.096 
(0.132)
0.387* 
(0.135)
-0.200 
(0.106)
-0.242* 
(0.107)
0.021* 
(0.007)
0.030 * 
(0.008)
16.419 * 
(1.088)
-0.002 
(0.001)
0.863* 
(0.310)
2.416* 
(0.374)
0.202* 
(0.049)
21.164* 
(1.530) -0.446* 
(0.118)
-18.576 
(1.339)
Italy -0.140 
(0.136)
0.027 
(0.249)
-1.346* 
(0.311)
-0.232* 
(0.094)
0.384* 
(0.095)
-0.006 
(0.060)
-0.071 
(0.060)
0.009 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
6.412* 
(0.418)
-0.010* 
(0.0005)
2.580* 
(0.176)
0.321 
(0.279)
0.080* 
(0.012)
-0.499 
(0.407) 0.319* 
(0.076)
-4.402 
(0.426)
Portugal 0.214 
(0.198)
0.690* 
(0.241)
1.411* 
(0.666)
0.097 
(0.140)
0.069 
(0.134)
-0.0007 
(0.084)
0.012 
(0.085)
0.003 
(0.007)
0.002 
(0.008)
9.045* 
(0.594)
-0.001* 
(0.0002)
2.089* 
(0.418)
-1.734* 
(0.407)
0.132* 
(0.009)
-0.068 
(0.493) 0.804* 
(0.126)
-8.568 
(0.666)
Spain 0.163 
(0.147)
-0.821* 
(0.312)
1.568* 
(0.545)
-0.322* 
(0.091)
0.483* 
(0.101)
0.0006 
(0.053)
-0.148* 
(0.053)
0.011* 
(0.005)
0.003 
(0.005)
8.707* 
(0.455)
-0.004* 
(0.0002)
3.555* 
(0.367)
-2.688* 
(0.378)
1.101* 
(0.038)
8.716* 
(0.984)
0.014 
(0.071)
-18.072 
(0.633)
Switzerla
nd 
0.041 
(0.105)
0.605* 
(0.114)
-0.129 
(0.191)
0.046 
(0.058)
0.194* 
(0.066)
0.040 
(0.047)
-0.052 
(0.046)
0.008* 
(0.004)
0.011* 
(0.003)
5.733* 
(0.320)
-0.002* 
(0.0002)
2.821* 
(0.191)
0.730* 
(0.270)
-0.038* 
(0.018)
-0.270 
(0.321) 0.608* 
(0.056)
-7.955 
(0.436)
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UK 0.251 
(0.129)
0.790* 
(0.156)
1.109* 
(0.398)
0.704* 
(0.075)
0.403* 
(0.080)
-0.198* 
(0.059)
-0.180* 
(0.054)
0.028* 
(0.004)
0.029* 
(0.004)
12.056* 
(0.545)
-0.0006* 
(0.0002)
-0.398* 
(0.182)
0.832* 
(0.204)
-0.97*1 
(0.038)
-3.273* 
(0.600)
0.454* 
(0.062)
1.394 
(0.585)
Regressi
on 
coefficie
nts 
Gender 
(male)
Immigra
nt (First 
or 
second 
generatio
n)
Foreign 
language 
used at 
home
Cultural 
possessio
ns
Family 
wealth
Mother 
ISCED
Father 
ISCED
Mother 
SES
Father 
SES
School-
soc 
composit
ion
School 
size
Admissi
on-
parents' 
endorse
ment of 
the 
school’s 
educatio
nal 
philosop
hy
Admissi
on- 
special 
program
Student-
teacher 
ratio
Compute
r-student 
ratio
Educatio
nal 
resources
Constant
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS
Canada 0.575* 
(0.117)
0.350* 
(0.139)
-0.747* 
(0.224)
0.300* 
(0.067)
0.240* 
(0.080)
-0.090 
(0.064)
0.034 
(0.060)
-0.008* 
(0.004)
0.014* 
(0.004)
12.690* 
(0.433)
-0.007* 
(0.0003)
2.800* 
(0.144)
-0.158 
(0.135)
-0.100* 
(0.020)
-0.660 
(0.344)
0.935* 
(0.068)
-7.934 
(0.554)
Israel 0.024 
(0.186)
-0.060 
(0.195)
0.650* 
(0.286)
0.102 
(0.107)
-0.520* 
(0.113)
0.043 
(0.109)
0.071 
(0.098)
0.002 
(0.006)
0.0005 
(0.006)
3.772* 
(0.538)
-0.002* 
(0.0003)
1.496* 
(0.334)
-2.266* 
(0.318)
-0.018 
(0.020)
0.0007 
(0.0004)
0.013 
(0.090)
-3.090 
(0.733)
New 
Zealand
0. 703* 
(0.185)
0.154 
(0.188)
-1.016* 
(0.392)
0.014 
(0.095)
0.391* 
(0.108)
-0.120 
(0.076)
0.038 
(0.079)
0.006 
(0.006)
0.018* 
(0.005)
6.297* 
(0.588)
-0.0003 
(0.0003)
Dropped 
‡
0.802* 
(0.340)
0.343* 
(0.034)
17.491* 
(1.006)
0.825* 
(0.076)
-17.764 
(1.089)
USA 0.284* 
(0.121)
0.720* 
(0.210)
-0.443 
(0.362)
0.184* 
(0.066)
-0.076 
(0.079)
-0.160* 
(0.070)
-0.282* 
(0.064)
0.015* 
(0.004)
0.019* 
(0.004)
7.010* 
(0.366)
-0.003* 
(0.0002)
2.890* 
(0.172)
0.517* 
(0.205)
-0.083* 
(0.020)
-1.072* 
(0.392)
0.621* 
(0.066)
-4.242 
(0.513)
LATIN AMERICA
Argentin
a 
0.664* 
(0.260)
0.892 
(0.642)
1.548 
(1.871)
-0.118 
(0.158)
0.124 
(0.157)
0.200 
(0.108)
0.170 
(0.105)
-0.020* 
(0.009)
-0.016 
(0.008)
15.92* 
(1.416)
-0.001* 
(0.0004)
2.220* 
(0.578)
-2.056* 
(0.713)
0.303* 
(0.030)
55.455* 
(5.681)
0.664* 
(0.141)
-16.18 
(1.551)
Brazil -0.162 
(0.120)
0.085 
(0.423)
-0.607 
(1.348)
-0.058 
(0. 074)
0.898* 
(0.081)
0.011 (0. 
041)
-0.042 
(0.039)
0.009* 
(0.004)
0.008* 
(0.004)
7.528* 
(0.347)
-0.0006* 
(0.0000)
0.499* 
(0.152)
0.974* 
(0.156)
0.004 
(0.005)
1.940* 
(0.658)
0.699* 
(0.046)
-5.123 
(0.374)
Chile 0.105 
(0.175)
-0.976 
(0.653)
0.908 
(1.144)
0.137 
(0.104)
0.365* 
(0.115)
0.125 
(0.080)
-0.094 
(0.078)
-0.005 
(0.006)
0.005 
(0.007)
9.884* 
(0.641)
-0.001* 
(0.0002)
-0.110 
(0.338)
-0.623* 
(0.285)
-0.031* 
(0.013)
37.166* 
(3.877)
0.343* 
(0.107)
-3.443 
(0.607)
Columbi
a 
-0.434 
(0.306)
2.490* 
(0.947)
1.386 
(1.764)
0.123 
(0.198)
0.140 
(0.190)
-0.014 
(0.102)
0.009 
(0.090)
0.022* 
(0.010)
-0.025* 
(0.011)
9.866* 
(1.162)
-0.0002 
(0.0003)
0.067 
(0.542)
-1.705* 
(0.433)
-0.205* 
(0.036)
-7.966* 
(1.927)
1.982* 
(0.269)
2.890 
(1.147)
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Mexico -0.442* 
(0.093)
0.016 
(0.279)
-1.988 
(1.112)
0.101 
(0.056)
0.534* 
(0.060)
-0.021 
(0.033)
-0.023 
(0.033)
0.004 
(0.003)
0.000 
(0.003)
5.453* 
(0.245)
-0.002* 
(0.0001)
1.106* 
(0.101)
0.490* 
(0.112)
-0.017* 
(0.004)
5.305* 
(0.618)
0.399* 
(0.038)
-2.557 
(0.304)
Peru -1.151* 
(0.325)
-1.341 
(1.478)
-3.259 
(4.106)
-0.148 
(0.174)
0.281 
(0.148)
0.079 
(0.129)
-0.200 
(0.137)
0.011 
(0.011)
0.023* 
(0.010)
2.437* 
(0.878)
-0.002* 
(0.0003)
Dropped 
†
Dropped 
†
0.0008 
(0.024)
-0.011 
(0.059)
-1.676* 
(0.253)
2.362 
(0.976)
Uruguay -0.375* 
(0.163)
0.341 
(0.478)
-1.110 
(1.237)
-0.136 
(0.103)
0.768* 
(0.109)
-0.089 
(0.058)
0.092 
(0.052)
0.015* 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.005)
10.990* 
(0.647)
-0.003* 
(0.0005)
4.111* 
(0.210)
1.240* 
(0.180)
0.033* 
(0.016)
1.518 
(1.809)
1.980* 
(0.100)
-6.235 
(0.512)
Regressi
on 
coefficie
nts 
Gender 
(male)
Immigra
nt (First 
or 
second 
generatio
n)
Foreign 
language 
used at 
home
Cultural 
possessio
ns
Family 
wealth
Mother 
ISCED
Father 
ISCED
Mother 
SES
Father 
SES
School-
soc 
composit
ion
School 
size
Admissi
on-
parents' 
endorse
ment of 
the 
school’s 
educatio
nal 
philosop
hy
Admissi
on- 
special 
program
Student-
teacher 
ratio
Compute
r-student 
ratio
Educatio
nal 
resources
Constant
ASIA
Taiwan -0.065 
(0.077)
0.275 
(0.266)
0.771 
(0.572)
-0.046 
(0.050)
0.391* 
(0.065)
-0.059 
(0.037)
-0.005 
(0.035)
0.012* 
(0.003)
-0.0007 
(0.003)
2.035* 
(0.277)
0.0001* 
(0.0000)
1.804* 
(0.092)
1.403* 
(0.111)
0.252* 
(0.009)
5.080* 
(0.316)
0.370* 
(0.029)
-9.223 
(0.332)
Indonesi
a 
0.139* 
(0.069)
-0.224 
(0.450)
0.236 
(0.226)
-0.209* 
(0.041)
0.363* 
(0.037)
0.023 
(0.030)
-0.049 
(0.030)
0.009* 
(0.003)
0.0004 
(0.003)
-1.323* 
(0.367)
-0.003* 
(0.0001)
0.869* 
(0.125)
0.413* 
(0.131)
0.117* 
(0.006)
0.001* 
(0.0003)
0.051* 
(0.020)
-2.088 
(0.242)
Japan -0.507* 
(0.071)
0.312 
(0.404)
0.494 
(0.767)
0.005 
(0.042)
0.078 
(0.056)
0.043 
(0.038)
-0.022 
(0.032)
0.006* 
(0.002)
0.003 
(0.002)
1.507* 
(0.194)
0.002* 
(0.0001)
2.006* 
(0.077)
-0.097 
(0.081)
-0.167* 
(0.013)
-0.767* 
(0.273)
0.220* 
(0.035)
-1.390 
(0.295)
Korea -0.386* 
(0.087)
Dropped 
‡
Dropped 
‡
0.064 
(0.053)
0.210* 
(0.061)
-0.041 
(0.038)
-0.031 
(0.037)
-0.004 
(0.003)
0.009* 
(0.003)
4.032* 
(0.260)
0.001* 
(0.0001)
-0.352* 
(0.152)
0.436* 
(0.094)
0.018 
(0.026)
-2.835* 
(0.512)
0.379* 
(0.051)
-3.703 
(0.547)
Thailand -0.270* 
(0.085)
1.363* 
(0.339)
-0.376* 
(0.112)
-0.041 
(0.046)
0.404* 
(0.049)
-0.055 
(0.035)
0.092* 
(0.034)
0.003 
(0.004)
0.0005 
(0.003)
-1.086* 
(0.260)
-0.0001* 
(0.0000)
-0.631* 
(0.102)
Dropped 
‡
0.010 
(0.007)
12.355* 
(0.582)
0.397* 
(0.038)
-2.339 
(0.265)
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000. 2003 and 2006; †dropped due to be constant for private-dependent schools. ‡ dropped due to perfect correlation with other variables
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Table 3: Means of the coefficients of the logistic regressions (table 2) for two clusters
Name cluster Male Immi
grant
Foreign 
language 
used at
home
Cultural
Posses
sions
Family
wealth
Mother
ISCED
Father
ISCED
Mother
SES
Father
SES
School
Socio-
economic
com
position
School
size
Admission
parents'
endorsement 
of  school’s 
educational 
philosophy
Admission
Special
program
Teacher
Student
ratio
Computer
Student
ratio
Educational
resources
Cluster 
A (11)
Social class 
reproduction
.08 .24 -.72 .09 .39 -.08 -.07 .01 .01 8.09 -.00 1.86 .62 -.06 2.33 .53
Cluster 
B (9)
Good-
equipped 
school for 
outsiders
.08 .13 1.07 .03 .13 .03 -.00 .00 -.00 6.91 -.00 1.99 -1.22 .16 11.41 .54
Cluster 
A1 (4)
Educational 
philosophy
.42 .42 -.44 .13 .13 -.10 -.08 .01 .02 7.86 -.00 2.71 .04 -.03 -.12 .59
Cluster 
A2 (5)
Richness -.20 .05 -.96 -.11 .59 -.02 -.02 .01 .00 5.81 -.00 1.83 .69 .04 1.65 .69
Cluster 
A3 (2)
Cultural 
elite
.09 .35 -.66 .51 .39 -.20 -.21 .02 .03 14.24 -.00 .23 1.62 -.38 8.95 .00
Cluster 
B4 (7)
Cultural rich 
parents
.07 -.32 .96 .04 .13 .02 -.04 .01 .00 5.20 -.00 2.23 -1.03 .19 7.88 .32
Cluster 
B5 (2)
Foreigner in 
poor 
countries
.11 1.69 1.47 .00 .13 .09 .09 .00 -.02 12.89 -.01 1.14 -1.88 .05 23.74 1.32
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000. 2003 and 2006. 
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 Table 4: Effect of attending a private-independent school vs. a public school on reading achievement 
Simple reading score 
difference between 
private and public 
schools pupils
No of observed 
pupils
Reading score 
difference of the 
private- nearest public 
school neighbour in 
propensity scores
No of pupils 
(private/ public)
Reading score difference 
of the private –public 
school pupils based on 
nearest neighbour and 
Mahalanibis distance
No of pupils 
(private/ public)
Europe
Austria 21.52 (5.51)*** 7482 9.19 (9.11) (243/ 194) 8.57 (8.51) (243/207)
Belgium 46.98 (5.80)*** 3993 25.63 (9.14)** (242/183) 25.68 (9.93)** (258/194)
France 11.52 (5.68)* 1993 5.84 (8.12) (228/194) 2.51 (7.96) (228/198)
Greece 61.03 (5.03) *** 7310 129.70 (23.99)*** (157/ 62) 207.88 (40.83)*** (357/ 61 )
Italy 7.52 (4.55) 17678 -10.40 (11.92) (368/ 230) -19.21 (10.67) (368/ 225
Portugal 60.72 (6.13) *** 8460 -8.44 (15.22) (115/ 74) -27.17 (29.67) (204/81)
Spain 38.10 (2.04)*** 12500 5.35 (27.36) (1273/ 171) 16.01 (11.93) (1273/188)
Switzerland 0.70 (3.72) 16244 -16.25 (7.32)* (509 /375) -13.90 (7.34) (509/386)
Other industrialized 
UK 74.59 (2.97)*** 19104 12.23 (11.34) (648/ 258) 7.93 (9.55) (648/ 265)
Canada 46.90 (2.54)*** 27592 44.05 (10.35)*** (863/ 323) 41.45 (10.49) ** (1121 /336)
Israel 32.32 (7.92) *** 2048 34.46 (12.77) ** (153/ 111) 26.48 (17.38) (169/ 113)
New Zealand 42.19 (5.21) *** 3407 12.16 (9.84) (260/ 164) 25.24 (13.04) (353/165)
USA 20.69 (5.36)*** 4186 2.01 (10.43) (276/ 163) 6.88 (11.49) (276/ 152)
Latin America
Argentina 70.80 (6.23)*** 2023 -11.97 (29.28) (129/ 46) 5.39 (37.39) (296/52)
Brazil 103.07 (3.18)*** 6990 16.74 (17.75) (728/ 305) 24.59 (11.68)* (810/317)
Chile 86.65 (3.76)*** 2650 -4.47 (12.36) (238/134) 1.44 (14.82) (686/156)
Columbia 61.41 (5.95)*** 1674 -5.54 (15.34) (173/ 54) -0.43 (16.26) (280/52)
Mexico 47.25 (2.29) *** 11737 -20.66 (7.61)** (1092/ 450) -27.82 (8.75) ** (1330/461)
Peru 92.43 (6.71) *** 972 59.22 (18.78)** (69/ 49) 87.43 (31.74)** (162/59)
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Uruguay 97.23 (3.09)*** 5665 23.69 (14.16) (362/ 159) 22.48 (22.18) (1493/174)
Asia
Taiwan -23.19 (1.94)*** 5510 -26.72 (7.47) *** (1882/ 736) -37.79 (4.15) *** (2114/ 799)
Indonesia -11.91 (2.05) *** 5269 -3.83 (3.76) (1443 /783 ) -4.58 (3.57) (1471/ 801)
Japan -13.82 (2.59) *** 6152 -45.34 (4.93) *** (1520/ 856) -49.33 (4.79) *** (1656/ 917)
Korea 39.25 (2.83) *** 4004 2.92 (4.73) (1013/ 620) 3.03 (4.58) (1052/628)
Thailand 6.41 (2.76) * 10122 -19.43 (4.33) (740/ 610) -15.54 (4.71)** (772/605)
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000. 2003 and 2006. 
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1 This article is one of the products of the cross-national project „Religious education in a multicultural society: School 
and home in comparative context”, directed by Emer Smith (Economic & Social Research Institute, Dublin) and 
financed by the European Commision within the 7th Frame Work (FP7-SSH-2007-1- REMC). 
2 In subsequent studies, we will compare the choice/effectiveness gaps between public and private-independent schools, 
as well as compare school effects concerning student attitudes on environmental issues and school climate.
3 We use for the description of this technique the article of Frisco, Muller & Frank (2007), who use this technique in 
their analysis of the effects of parental divorce on children’s well-being.
4 We use nearest neighbour and nearest neighbour with Mahalanobis distance matching;
5 Normally, this should not be a big problem; see Morgan & Winship (2007)
6 The PISA survey does not distinguish between denominational and non-denominational schools.
7 We could only use the first PISA wave for France, because the public data set of the second and third PISA wave do 
not contain valid values for French public and private school indicator. We have to assume that this private-public 
distinction has become a state-secret, too annoying for the secular French Republic to be published.
8 Parental endorsement figures in the admission policies of all private-independent schools in France, New Zealand and 
Peru, therefore a coefficient could not be computed for this variable in these five countries.
9 This is a negative coefficient in table 2, because the variable is the student-teacher ratio.
10 Based on country of birth of (one of) the parents outside the country of birth and/or the foreign language used at 
home.
11 Given the different measurement scales of variables, we multiplied the coefficient by the existing range in the sample 
to compute a maximum effect; also-the analysis uses the Gower measure and the Ward’s method of clustering.
12 We had to delete from the cluster analysis those countries (France, Korea, New Zealand, Peru, Thailand) for which 
not all parameters are available.
13 Information about the characteristics of the matched treated and control pupils and their parents is available from the 
first author.
